Sale of a Retained Life Estate in Contemplation of Death-Effect Upon the Gross Estate by Kenin, David S.
University of Miami Law Review 
Volume 17 Number 1 Article 11 
10-1-1962 
Sale of a Retained Life Estate in Contemplation of Death-Effect 
Upon the Gross Estate 
David S. Kenin 
Follow this and additional works at: https://repository.law.miami.edu/umlr 
Recommended Citation 
David S. Kenin, Sale of a Retained Life Estate in Contemplation of Death-Effect Upon the Gross Estate, 17 
U. Miami L. Rev. 95 (1962) 
Available at: https://repository.law.miami.edu/umlr/vol17/iss1/11 
This Case Noted is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at University of Miami School of Law 
Institutional Repository. It has been accepted for inclusion in University of Miami Law Review by an authorized 
editor of University of Miami School of Law Institutional Repository. For more information, please contact 
library@law.miami.edu. 
CASES NOTED
the workmen's compensation law to provide explicitly that workmen's
compensation benefits are excluded for the time period when unemploy-
ment benefits have been collected.
TAYLOR MATTIS
SALE OF A RETAINED LIFE ESTATE IN CONTEMPLATION
OF DEATH-EFFECT UPON THE GROSS ESTATE
The deceased created an irrevocable trust for her children, reserv-
ing to herself three-fifths of the income for life. In contemplation of death,
at a time when her life estate was valued at 135,000 dollars, the deceased
transferred her life estate to her son for a consideration of 140,000 dol-
lars. At the time of the deceased's death three-fifths of the corpus was
valued at 900,000 dollars. The commissioner assessed an estate tax on
the corpus, less the 140,000-dollar purchase price of the life estate. The
executors were successful in their suit for a refund. On appeal, held, re-
versed: the corpus of a reserved life estate is not removed from a
decedent's gross estate by a transfer at the value of the life estate in
contemplation of death. United States v. Allen, 293 F.2d 916 (10th Cir.),
cert. denied, 368 U.S. 944 (1961).
The question of whether the sale of a retained life estate, for ade-
quate consideration, in contemplation of death, will remove the entire
corpus of previously transferred property from the gross estate appears
to be novel to the federal courts. Section 2036(a)(1) of the Internal
Revenue Code of 19541 provides, in part, that the value of the corpus
of a trust created by the decedent, in which the decedent retained the
right to income for life or for any period not ascertainable without refer-
ence to his death or for any period which does not in fact end before his
death, shall be included in his gross estate.2 A literal reading of this
1. In the instant case decedent died and the controversy arose prior to the adoption of
theInternal Revenue Code of 1954. Therefore, the 1939 Code was applicable. The applicable
sections of the 1939 Code and their 1954 counterparts are as follows: Section 811(c)(1)(A)
of the 1939 Code corresponds to section 2035 of the 1954 Code and section 811(c)(1)(B)
of the 1939 Code corresponds to section 2036 of the 1954 Code. In so far as the instant case
is concerned there is no difference in effect between these sections of the Code. For purposes
of clarity the 1954 Code will be used as the reference herein. Unless otherwise specified all
citations will be to that Code.
2. Section 2036(a) (1) reads as follows:
(a) The value of the gross estate shall include the value of all property (except real
property situated outside of the United States) to the extent of any interest
therein of which the decedent has at any time made a transfer (except in case
of a bona fide sale for an adequate and full consideration in money or money's
worth), by trust or otherwise, under which he has retained for his life or for
any period not ascertainable without reference to his death or for any period
which does not in fact end before his death-
(1) the possession or enjoyment of, or the right to the income from, the
property . . ..
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section indicates that the interest is not to be included in the gross estate
if it has not been retained for life.' Section 2035 provides that the gross
estate shall include property transferred by the decedent in contempla-
tion of death to the extent that he has not received a money's worth flow
therefor.' The value of property transferred by the decedent for a full
money's worth flow is not included in his gross estate even if it was
transferred in contemplation of death.5
Prior to United States v. Allen no federal tax case ruled directly on
this point. However, the issue has been touched upon in two cases in-
volving local estate taxes6 and in one revenue ruling.
7
In In re Thurston's Estate,8 the decedent conveyed two parcels of
real estate to his children and reserved to himself a life estate in each.
Subsequently, he relinquished the life estate in one of the parcels for
10,000 dollars, which was adequate consideration for the life estate. The
tract had a value of 134,000 dollars. The California Code contained pro-
visions9 essentially the same as sections 2035 and 2036 of the Internal
Revenue Code. The court excluded the relinquished tract from the gross
estate of the decedent upon a finding that the release of the life estate
was not made in contemplation of death. By way of dicta the court said:
There is no reason to favor the transferor who relinquishes his
interest in contemplation of death over the taxpayer who retains
the shackles on the property until his death .... The life estate
relinquished in contemplation of death is therefore in the same
category as it would have been if the transfer had not been
made, and the tax is imposed as if it had been retained until the
transferor's death. A tax measured by the value of the entire
corpus transferred cannot be avoided by the payment of con-
sideration equal to the value of the interest relinquished.1"
In Heller v. District of Columbia" the decedent executed a trust in
which she retained the right to income for her life. Three months prior
to her death she renounced her right to the income. The Board of Tax
3. See Rev. Rul. 56-324, 1956-2 CuM. BULL. 999.
4. Section 2035(a) provides:
(a) The value of the gross estate shall include the value of all property . . . to the
extent of any interest therein of which the decedent has at any time made a
transfer (except in case of a bona fide sale for an adequate and full considera-
tion in money or money's worth), by trust or otherwise, in contemplation of
death.
5. The rationale is that the consideration, if adequate and full, will take the place of
the transferred property and the decedent's gross estate will not have been depleted.
6. Heller v. District of Columbia, 198 F.2d 983 (D.C. Cir. 1952); In re Thurston's
Estate, 36 Cal. 2d 207, 223 P.2d 12 (1950).
7. Rev. Rul. 56-324, 1956-2 Cum. BULL. 999.
8. 36 Cal. 2d 207, 223 P.2d 12 (1950).
9. CAL. REV. & TAX. CODE §§ 13641, 13642, 13644.
10. In re Thurston's Estate, 36 Cal. 2d 207, 214, 215; 223 P.2d 12, 16, 17 (1950).
(Emphasis added.)
11. 198 F.2d 983 (D.C. Cir. 1952).
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Appeals for the District of Columbia"2 found the renunciation to have
been in contemplation of death and assessed an estate tax.'" The court of
appeals affirmed saying in part:
Obviously she could not render non-taxable a previous transfer
which was clearly taxable by renouncing, in contemplation of
death, the reserved interest which had made it taxable."4
In a 1956 revenue ruling 5 the commissioner took the position that
the assignment or relinquishment by the decedent of the possession, en-
joyment, or right to the income from the property, or the right to desig-
nate the persons who shall possess or enjoy the property or the income
therefrom in contemplation of death, will render the entire value of
property, otherwise includible in the decedent's gross estate under section
2036(a) (1), includible in his gross estate under section 2035. This ruling
cited with approval, both the dicta in Thurston and the holding in Heller.
It should be noted, however, that only in Thurston did the decedent re-
ceive an adequate money's worth flow of consideration for the life estate.
In Heller there was no consideration given for the decedent's relinquish-
ment. In Revenue Ruling 56-324 the effect of adequate consideration paid
for the life estate, does not appear to have been considered. Only in
Thurston, and there only by way of dicta, does the effect of adequate
consideration for the transfer of the life estate appear to have been con-
sidered.
In reaching its conclusion in Allen, thecourt did not rely upon the
express terms of either section 2035 or section 2036, nor did it rely upon
any case in point. Instead, the court looked to the intent of Congress and
to the general policy of the estate tax. The court said:
It does not seem plausible ... that Congress intended to allow
such an easy avoidance of the taxable incidence befalling re-
served life estates. This result would allow a taxpayer to reap
the benefits of property for his lifetime and, in contemplation of
death, sell only the interest entitling him to the income, thereby
removing all of the property which he has enjoyed from his gross
estate. Giving the statute a reasonable interpretation, we cannot
believe this to be its intendment. It seems certain that ... Con-
gress meant the estate to include the corpus of the trust or, in
its stead, an amount equal in value.16
Noteworthy is the fact that the court cited as authority Helvering v.
12. Now the District of Columbia Tax Court.
13. Section 47-1601 of the D.C. CODE (1940) contained provisions similar to sections
2035 and 2036.
14. 198 F.2d at 985.
15. Rev. Rul. 56-324, 1956-2 Cumt. Bu-ss. 999. See also, Treas. Reg. § 20.2035-1(b)
(1958).
16. United States v. Allen, 293 F.2d 916, 918 (10th Cir. 1961).
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Hallock,'7 Commissioner v. Wemyss ss and Commissioner v. Estate of
Church."9 In these cases the Supreme Court determined that substance
governs form and that the niceties of property conveyancing have no
proper place in the law of taxation.20
The result in United States v. Allen contains implications which go
beyond section 2036. The decision indicates that one who keeps a
"string" on property given to others in an inter vivos transfer may not
sell that "string" in contemplation of death and expect the property to
escape the estate tax, even if he receives adequate consideration for the
"string." There is no reason why this rationale can not be applied to all
sections of the Code dealing with inter vivos transfers in which some
"string" or hold was retained by the deceased. Similar treatment should be
accorded to the sale of retained interests in contemplation of death when
applied to: (1) a reserved life estate in connection with section 2036;21
(2) a reversionary interest in connection with section 2037; (3) a power
to alter or revoke in connection with section 2038; (4) the decedent's
annuity in connection with section 2039; (5) the interest of a joint owner
in connection with section 2040;22 (6) a power of appointment in con-
nection with section 2041; and (7) incidents of ownership in life in-
surance payable to beneficiaries other than the estate of the insured in
connection with section 2042.23
From a policy point of view the decision seems correct, even though
it does stretch the Code to some degree. The determination of what con-
sideration will be adequate to remove the entire property from the gross
17. 309 U.S. 106 (1940).
18. 324 U.S. 303 (1945).
19. 335 U.S. 632 (1949).
20. Breitenstein, J., in a separate concurring opinion, interpreted section 2036 (811 (1) (B)
of the 1939 Code) differently than the majority. "As I read the statute the tax liability
arises at the time of the inter vivos transfer under which there was a retention of the right
to income for life. The disposition thereafter of that retained right does not eliminate the
tax liability." United States v. Allen, 293 F.2d 916, 918 (10th Cir. 1961). This view does not
appear to be in accord with the commissioner's position in Rev. Rul. 56-324, 1956-2 Cum.
Bia.. 999. It was rejected in In re Thurston, 36 Cal. 2d 207, 223 P.2d 12 (1950). There is
some support for this view. See Rottschaeffer, Taxation of Transfers Taking Effect in Pos-
session at Grantor's Death, 26 IowA L. REv. 514, 526-28 (1941).
21. As in the instant case.
22. There are a number of cases which indicate that a contrary result has been reached
where property held by a decedent and another as joint tenants or tenants by the entirety
has been transferred in contemplation of death, or where the joint estate has been converted
into a tenancy in common in contemplation of death. A. Carl Borner, 25 T.C. 584 (1955),
acq., Rev. Rul. 57-448, 1957-2 Cur. BULL. 618; Sullivan's Estate v. Commissioner, 175 F.2d
657 (9th Cir. 1949). These cases apparently follow the theory that the word "interest," as
contained in section 2035, refers only to the retained interest and that a transfer of the
retained interest for adequate consideration will exclude the entire property, otherwise tax-
able, from the gross estate. The result is that only one-half of the value of the property is
included in the decedent's gross estate.
23. See generally, Lowndes, Cutting the "Strings" on Inter Vivos Transfers in Con-
templation of Death, 43 MINN. L. Rxv. 57 (1958).
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estate was made from the viewpoint of tax law rather than from the view-
point of technical property law, and this is as it should be.24
DAvID S. KENIN
THE EXEMPTION OF PROCEEDS FROM A VOLUNTARY
SALE OF HOMESTEAD PROPERTY
The plaintiff-appellant secured a writ of garnishment against the
proceeds of a voluntary sale of the defendant-appellees' homestead
property. Subsequently, the court dissolved the writ upholding the
defendants' contention that the constitutional provision' exempting home-
stead property from forced sale extended to the proceeds of this sale. On
appeal, the District Court of Appeal, Second District, noting the lower
court's construction of a constitutional provision, transferred2 the case
to the Florida Supreme Court.3 Held, reversed and remanded4 with
directions to apply the following rule: All or any portion of the proceeds
of a voluntary sale will be exempt from forced levy, provided the vendor
can show by a preponderance of the evidence the existence of a bona fide
pre-sale intention to reinvest the designated amount in another homestead
within a reasonable time. These proceeds must be kept segregated from
other monies' and must not be put to intervening use. Orange Brevard
Plumbing & Heating Co. v. LaCroix, 137 So.2d 201 (Fla. 1962).
The underlying purpose of exempting homestead property from
forced sale is to conserve the home' in order to protect "the family from
dependence and want."' The first homestead exemption law was enacted
24. Commissioner v. Estate of Church, 335 U.S. 632 (1949); Commissioner v. Wemyss,
324 U.S. 303 (1945) ; Helvering v. Hallock, 309 U.S. 106 (1940).
1. FLA. CONST. art. X, § 1. "A homestead to the extent of one hundred and sixty acres
of land, or the half of one acre within the limits of any incorporated city or town, owned by
the head of a family residing in this state, together with one thousand dollars worth of
personal property, and the improvements on the real estate, shall be exempt from forced
sale under process of any court . .. ."
2. FLA. APP. R. 2.1(a) (5) (d). "When the jurisdiction of an appellate court has been
improvidently invoked, that court may of its own motion . . . enter an order transferring
[the case] . . . to the court having jurisdiction."
3. FLA. APP. R. 2.1(a) (5) (a). "Appeals from trial courts may be taken directly to the
Supreme Court as a matter of right . . . from final judgments . . . construing a controlling
provision of the Florida or Federal Constitution ....
4. See note 31 inlra.
5. Cullen v. Harris, 111 Mich. 20, 69 N.W. 78 (1896).
6. WAPLES, HOMESTEAD AND EXEPTIONS 3 (1893).
7. THOMPSON, HOMESTEAD AND EXEMPTIONS 39 (1886); Beall v. Pinckney, 150 F.2d 467,
470 (5th Cir. 1945); 16 FLA. JUR. Homestead § 4 (1957); 26 AM. Jua. Homestead § 6
(1940) ; BOYER, FLORIDA REAL ESTATE TRaNSACTIONS § 21.03, at 467, 471 (1959). In Collins
v. Collins, 150 Fla. 374, 377, 7 So.2d 443, 444 (1942), the court said: "The purpose of the
homestead is to shelter the family and to provide it a refuge from the stresses and strains
of misfortune."
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